I-0389: Recovery To A Known State
- Subject: I-0389: Recovery To A Known State
- From: "Interpretations Working Group" <iwg@gibraltar.ncsc.mil>
- Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 15:13:47 -0800
- Content-type: Multipart/Mixed; boundary=Message-Boundary-24296
- Priority: normal
[The following is the ASCII version of the proposal as posted on Gibraltar. A
pretty-printed PDF version is attached.]
This transaction consists of a proposal for a National Interpretation of
a Common Criteria document. It is being posted in accordance with the
procedures of the IWG.
Comments on this proposal are welcomed and should be posted to this
transaction chain. If any party wishes to post a comment anonymously,
the comment should be mailed to IWG@gibraltar.ncsc.mil in a form
suitable for posting. All comments should be posted no later than
Monday, February 5, 2001.
CCITSE/CEM NIAP INTERPRETATION (PROPOSED)
_________________________________________________________________
I-0389: Recovery To A Known State
_________________________________________________________________
NUMBER: I-0389
STATUS: Ready for External Review
TYPE: NIAP Interpretation
TITLE: Recovery To A Known State
SOURCE REFERENCE: CC v2.1 Part 2 Subclause 10.8 FPT_RCV
CC v2.1 Part 2 Subclause J.8 FPT_RCV
RELATED TO:
I-0406 Automated Or Manual Recovery Is Acceptable
ISSUE:
There are situations where some form of recovery from a known backup
is required, but there is no formal model to argue that the known
state is provably secure.
STATEMENT OF INTERPRETATION:
It must be possible to recover to a known previous state, as opposed
to one that is provably secure.
SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION:
To address this interpretation, the following changes are made to CC
v2.1, Part 2: (additions marked _thusly_; deletions marked _[DEL:_
thusly _:DEL]_ )
* The following component is added to the FPT_RCV family in
Subclause 10.8. This component would be immediately below the
current lowest component in the existing FPT_RCV hierarchy:
FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1 Recovery to Known State
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1.1 For [selection: [assignment: _list of
failures/service discontinuities_], _"no failures/service
discontinuities"_], the TSF shall ensure the return of the TOE to a
previously known state using automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1.2 When automated recovery from a failure or
service discontinuity is not possible, the TSF shall enter a
maintenance mode where the ability to return the TOE to a
previously known state is provided.
Dependencies:
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
* In Subclause 10.8, rework the component levellings to make
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406 immediately hierarchical to the new component.
_IWG Note: This is operating on the assumption that I-0406 is
approved before I-0389. If that is not the case, then
FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406 above should be changed to FPT_RCV.1._
* In Clause 10, Figure 10.1, the class decomposition figure is
updated to show that component 2-NIAP-0406 is immediately
hierarchical to component NIAP-0389-1.
_IWG Note: This assumes that I-0406 has been approved. If this is
not the case, Figure 10.1 is modified to show that component 1 is
immediately hierarchical to component NIAP-0389-1._
* In Subclause 10.8, add the following after the "Component
Levelling" diagram:
FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1 Recovery to a Known State, allows a TOE to only
provide mechanisms that involve human intervention to a previously
known, but not provably secure, state.
* In Subclause 10.8, FPT_RCV.2-NIAP-0406, change the "Hierarchical
To:" as follows:
Hierarchical To: _[DEL:_ No other components _:DEL]_
_FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1_
_IWG Note: This assumes that I-0406 is approved before I-0389. If
this is not the case, the above change should be made to FPT_RCV.1_
* In Subclause J.8, add the following after paragraph 1236:
FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1 Recovery to a Known State
In the hierarchy of the trusted recovery family, recovery that
recovered only to a previously known state, as opposed to known
secure state is the least desirable.
User Application Notes
This component is intended for use in TOEs that do not require
recovery to a known secure state. The requirements of this
component reduce the threat of protection compromise resulting from
an attended TOE returning to an unknown state after recovery from a
failure or other discontinuity.
Evaluator application notes
It is acceptable for the functions that are available to an
authorised user for trusted recovery to be available only in a
maintenance mode. Controls should be in place to limit access
during maintenance to authorised users.
If "no failures/service discontinuities" is selected for
FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389.1, this means that there are no explicitly
mandated discontinuities for which automated recovery must be
provided. The TOE developer always has the option to provide an
automated recovery mechanism for a discontinuity.
Operations
_Selection:_
_If there are no explicit situations for which automated recovery
is mandated, "no failures/service discontinuities" should be
selected in FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1.1. Otherwise, the assignment should
be selected to provide the list of failures or other
discontinuities for which automated recovery must be possible._
_It is acceptable for a PP author complete only the selection and
leave the assignment open, so as to indicate that the list of
discontinuities for which automated recovery is required must be
non-empty._
Assignment:
For FPT_RCV.NIAP-0389-1.1, the PP/ST author should specify the list
of failures or other discontinuities for which automated recovery
must be possible.
* In Annex J, Figure J.1, the class decomposition figure is updated
to show that component 2-NIAP-0406 is immediately hierarchical to
component NIAP-0389-1.
_IWG Note: This assumes that I-0406 has been approved. If this is
not the case, Figure J.1 is modified to show that component 1 is
immediately hierarchical to component NIAP-0389-1._
PROJECTED IMPACT:
Negligible impact anticipated.
SUPPORT:
_Note: This queue entry should not be sent to management until I-0406
is approved._
The words in the annex for FPT_RCV state:
Throughout this family, the phrase "secure state" is used. This
refers to some state in which the TOE has consistent TSF data and a
TSF that can correctly enforce the policy. This state may be the
initial "boot" of a clean system, or it might be some checkpointed
state. The "secure state" is defined in the TSP model. If the
developer provided a clear definition of the secure state and the
reason why it should be considered secure, the dependency from
FPT_FLS.1 to ADV_SPM.1 can be argued away.
Although this allows a secure state to be a previously checkpointed
state, this ability is buried. This component makes it explicit; it
also makes it clear that a previously known state may or may not be a
secure state.
Note: This interpretation is being applied to the CC as modified by
I-0406.
0389.pdf
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