Time for another Bagle
- Subject: Time for another Bagle
- From: Gary Stoneburner <gary.stoneburner@nist.gov>
- Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2004 10:22:03 -0400
- Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=====================_5112296==.ALT"
re:
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci993356,00.html
"Another Bagel variant, W32Bagle-AG@mm, has been upgraded to a
medium threat by AV vendors after last week's sudden outbreak of
Bagle-AF, which spread for a short period of time when AV scanners failed
to detect it."
"If a machine becomes infected, Symantec said, it will allow the
attacker to have remote, unauthorized access to the machine. "Due to
the ability of the remote user to perform so many different actions on
the server system -- including installation of applications -- it is
highly recommended that compromised systems be reinstalled,"
Symantec advised.
"Herndon, Va.-based TruSecure Corp. recommended blocking the .com,
.cpl, .exe, .hta, .scr, .vbs and .zip (password-protected) executable
extensions at the gateway to prevent infection by similar worm outbreaks.
When available, updated antivirus signatures will detect the worm.
"
Note - "which spread for a short period of time when AV scanners
failed to detect it". Things happen FAST now and there is
simply no reasonable expectation that this period of time will become
small enough to not pose a risk. There is going to be some time
between discovery and availability of new scanner definition, let alone
time to download of new definition and installation on all your
machines.
1. Seems to speak to AV with very frequent AV updates at the
system boundaries, both Internet and likely some internal segmentations
as well (a few machines to be rapidly updated). (PS: This is
in addition to AV on each host. :-)
As to blocking certain extensions, remember:
1. This is not a complete list of extensions that have ever
caused problems; for example .MP3 or .WMA (CERT CA 2002-37).
2. Just remember that it is easy to change the extension,
notify the recipient, and bypass the filtering. (Exposure is
reduced because the file is now expected from a known source, yet that
source is subject to infection just like everyone else. :-)
Cheers,
Gary
**************************************************************************
* Opinions expressed are not intended to reflect an official
position
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* Gary
Stoneburner
* Computer Security Division, National Institute of Standards &
Technology
* 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930, Gaithersburg, MD
20899-8930
* Phone: 301-975-5394, FAX: 301-948-0279, Email: Stoneburner@nist.gov
*
http://csrc.nist.gov/staff/stoneburner/gshome.html
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